

Preliminary draft

of

Report of SWNCC ad hoc Committee

October, 1946

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CONTENTS

A.	Introduction.....	page 1
B .	Classification of terms.....	page 4
C.	Analysis of shortcomings in the structure and conduct of psychological warfare in World War II.....	page 6
D.	The transition from peacetime information to wartime psychological warfare.....	page 12
E.	Recommendations for the peacetime creation of a psychological warfare organization.....	page 14
F.	Recommendations for the creation of a wartime psychological warfare organization.....	page 17
Appendix A:	tentative chart of wartime organization.	
Appendix B:	tentative chart of theater organization.	

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1.

A. Introduction

1. In a memorandum dated June 4, 1946, (referred to below as "SWNCC 304") the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air recommended:

- a) that there be undertaken "an analytical study
• of U.S. Psychological Warfare in World War II
with a view toward keeping this weapon in a
state of coordinated readiness for future
wartime employment."
- b) "that an ad hoc committee be appointed by
SWNCC to study and report on the future status
of psychological warfare", having first undertaken
a review of the conduct of psychological warfare
in World War II. The ad hoc committee was
directed to recommend both a peacetime and a
wartime psychological organization.

2. An ad hoc committee was appointed by SWNCC as follows:

Mr. W.T. Stone, Dept. of State (Chairman)

Col. D.W. Johnston, War Dept.

Capt. H.R. Thurber, Navy Dept.

In addition, [] CIG, and Mr. W.H. Tyler, ADE,
attended the meetings as observers.

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3. This committee undertook the following tasks:

- a) A definition of the terms "political warfare" and "psychological warfare".
- b) An analysis of the shortcomings in the conduct of psychological warfare in World War II.
- c) Recommendations for the ^{peacetime} creation of a ~~permanent~~ psychological warfare organization.
- d) Recommendations for the creation of a wartime psychological warfare organization.

Particular attention has been paid to the following aspects of peacetime information and wartime psychological warfare:

- a) Political direction.
- b) Procedure for the rapid drafting, clearance, and transmission of directives.
- c) Interdepartmental file of experienced psychological warfare personnel.
- d) Integration of civilian and military personnel engaged in psychological warfare in time of war.
- e) Transition of peacetime information to wartime psychological warfare.
- f) The machinery required for the effective inter-departmental coordination of psychological warfare.

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- g) The structure of a theater psychological warfare organization.

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B. Classification of Terms

1. The four instruments for making national policy effective in the international field consist of diplomacy (negotiation and bargaining among governmental representatives), economic bargaining and pressure, the threat or employment of military force, and information and propaganda. Information and propaganda must be applied in conjunction with action in the the other three fields, for maximum effect.
2. Maximum effectiveness in the management of our foreign relations can only be achieved if all four foregoing instruments are used in a planned and coordinated fashion. It is necessary for those persons in charge of planning, coordination, and execution to be keenly aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various techniques offered by all four elements.
3. In time of war, the use of all four of these instruments is determined by the war situation and they become instruments of warfare.
4. The meaning of a peacetime information and cultural relations program is clear and definite enough for planning purposes. Although the terms "political warfare" and "psychological warfare" have been loosely used by writers and public officials, it is agreed that the following definitions will be used:
 - a) Political Warfare is the use of all political means in

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time of war to influence a foreign State to act in conformity with the requirements of our foreign policy. Such means include economic pressure and bargaining, and information and propaganda.

- b) Psychological Warfare is the planned use of any means specifically designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to favor the accomplishment of the military, strategic, or national aims of the United States. ^(K) Psychological warfare usually appears as political warfare, plus such other elements as combat propaganda, subversion, and black operations. It is of paramount necessity to coordinate psychological warfare with all other types of military operations, and to continue throughout, political control of all its aspects which impinge on our foreign policy.

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C. Analysis of shortcomings
in the structure and
conduct of psychological
warfare in World War II.

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1. Background:

a. Policy:

From the beginning of World War II, groping efforts were made in Washington toward organization for the planning, control and execution of psychological warfare. In theaters of operations the general pattern for handling the function had been worked out at AFHQ. In Washington, the Office of War Information had emerged as the agency responsible for planning and executing the Federal program of overseas information and propaganda, within the limits of foreign policy and subject to the proviso that in a theater of operation, the theater commander controlled execution. OWI had an Overseas Planning Board, on which were represented in addition to top OWI officials, members of the State Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CIAA and the British Political Warfare Mission attended as observers, for purposes of information and coordination. This Board cleared a weekly Central Directive for conformity to military operations and foreign policy. The Directive governed a series of daily guidances which controlled the OWI overseas output, and which were communicated to OWI offices and to major Psychological Warfare agencies in military commands abroad, as the established U.S. government propaganda policy. In London a Joint

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Directive was worked out between the American and British civilian propaganda agencies, which was communicated to European Theater military and other field organizations, as joint policy to govern all joint propaganda operations.

b. Execution:

The chief agency for execution of psychological warfare was the OWI Overseas Branch. OSS had extensive black operations as well, which included some propaganda. In Washington, these phases were coordinated with OWI overt operations by informal cooperation. In military theaters, they were coordinated through normal command channels and such organizations as PWB/SHAEP and PWB/AFHQ. The Army and Navy both conducted psychological warfare operations, partly through OWI and OSS agencies, partly through their own outlets, which involved procurement, organization, development, and training of personnel and equipment. Considerable cooperation was given to OWI and OSS in the transfer overseas of equipment and personnel, and in the discharge of other administrative tasks.

2. Shortcomings:

- a. Dispersion of authority and responsibility among several Washington agencies.
- b. Friction and distrust among top officials and operating personnel of the various agencies concerned.

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- c. Lack of adequate coordination on the planning and policy level, between military plans and operations, the planning and execution of foreign policy, and the conduct of world propaganda.
- d. Lack of understanding of the nature, ^{potentialities} capabilities and ^{limitations} effectiveness of psychological warfare by the top military and political leadership of the nation.

3. Dispersion of authority and responsibility:

The failure to concentrate psychological warfare operations in an agency which was trusted and utilized by the War, State and Navy Departments, led unavoidably to duplication of effort, competition for available supplies and personnel, faulty coordination with the major military, political, and economic programs of the government, and lessened striking effectiveness on the propaganda fronts throughout the world.

4. Friction and Distrust:

Responsibility for the control of policies intimately related to the execution of the propaganda program was dispersed among the chiefs of the Service agencies, the OWI, the Office of Censorship and the Department of State. These policies governed what could be disclosed, and what must be revealed. The chiefs of the Service

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agencies were concerned to protect military security and to further the needs and demands of the theater commanders, who in turn were chiefly concerned with the specific military and political problems confronting them. The OWI, particularly in its domestic operations, was concerned with the fullest possible disclosure of all information pertaining to the war effort. The fact that the Director of OWI was so concerned weighed as an instigator in the decisions of the Service chiefs concerning the time and extent to which he would be informed of military plans and military situations. Strong disagreements between prominent OWI personnel and the Department of State concerning various aspects of our foreign policy led to friction between these agencies, and failure to give adequate guidance, in time, in the field of foreign policy. The military leadership felt that the civilian propagandists could not be trusted with information of advance plans, even of the level of generality represented by Combined Chiefs of Staff directives. On the other hand, civilian agency employees in the field, under the military control of the theater commander, were often in possession of such information, and were not seldom in a position of having to take stands disapproved by or unknown to their civilian superiors, but desired by their theater command, which they could not justify to the home propaganda organization by referring merely to "operational requirements". The results were great friction and confusion, and loss of driving power on the world propaganda front. It was not until late in the war that a modus operandi was worked out,

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which even then only partially solved the problem as the basis for the difficulties — dispersion of authority and distrust — were not removed.

5. Lack of Adequate Coordination on Policy:

Despite the operation of the Planning Board and the nomination of representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Department of State to clear policy problems raised in the course of OWI operations, coordination was not adequate in many cases because the personnel nominated as representatives were not themselves capable of giving policy clearance, either because policy was unsettled, or because the representatives were not given access to the policy information necessary to make the required decision. Consequently OWI was often forced by operational requirements into the position of making policy decisions (or intelligence estimates) without firm knowledge of the basic policy requirements, or ability to get clearance for concrete proposals.

6. Lack of Understanding by Political and Military Leaders:

The really basic shortcoming was lack of comprehension of, or interest in the employment of psychological warfare, on the part of our political and military top leadership. This lack was at bottom responsible for the lack of concentration of organization, leadership, responsibility, and control of the function; lack of access of propaganda chiefs to vital information on political and military plans, and the faults of administrative organization arising from this dispersion

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and lack of top direction. As a nation have abhorred propaganda, and all the more so the extensions of psychological warfare into subversion, sabotage, deception, espionage, and the like. Only the stress of all-out warfare and the shock of Pearl Harbor made possible the little we did. There had been no advance planning, no training of personnel, no perfecting of techniques, no establishment of organizations capable of expansion to cope with wartime problems, prior to the onset of shooting war. Psychological warfare organization has had a history of improvisation and struggle -- not always with the enemy -- without strong central leadership, control, or integration with the other methods of attaining national objectives. Information and propaganda were well coordinated throughout with censorship; taken together they were only imperfectly coordinated with the other aspects of the national effort.

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D. The transition from peacetime
information to wartime
psychological warfare.

For planning purposes, it is important to distinguish three phases in the transition from normal peacetime information operations to wartime activity:

a) Time of peace with varying degrees of international tension:

During this phase the major information emphasis is on the explanation and justification of America's foreign policy, and on describing America's peaceful pursuits, her natural resources, her industrial and agricultural organization and potentialities, and her scientific and cultural activities and achievements.

b) Time of international crisis but juridical peace:

This phase appears if and when international relations between America and other powers develop to the point where strong political, economic and military pressure are required to effectuate America's foreign policy. It will be signalled by an act of the President or of the Congress, or both, comparable to the declaration of emergency in 1939, or the announcement of a policy to take immediate military action to defend America's nationals against possible foreign aggression. The major emphasis shifts from a purely informational and cultural program, to greater reliance upon tactics and propaganda more appropriate to political warfare.

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c) Time of War:

This phase is characterized by both psychological and warfare political/activities. New channels and media for the dissemination of propaganda are created as adjuncts to military formations in theaters of operations.

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E. Recommendations for the peacetime creation of a psychological warfare organization.

The ad hoc Committee recommends that a permanent sub-committee of SWNCC be created to serve as a planning body during phases a and b, to keep the subjects of political and psychological warfare under active review, to ^{formulate and present} ~~recommend~~ plans for the quick mobilization of existing organizations and machinery to accomplish the maximum degree of coordinated planning for operations in phase g. Specifically, this sub-committee should deal concretely with the following problems:

a. Wartime Organization:

Formulation of plans for a wartime psychological warfare organization which will ensure: (1) unified and effective political ^{& military} direction down to an including the theater command, close coordination with military operations, rapid and economical drafting and clearance of directives, and coordination of "white" and "black" operations; and (2) the establishment of an integrated service organization which will ensure that manpower, materials, and equipment are furnished to overseas organizations so policy directives can be transformed into effective action.

b. Personnel:

1. Establishment and maintenance of an interdepartmental index of persons with experience, special skills, or

qualifications for wartime psychological warfare.

2. Examination of the problems involved in procuring, assigning, and utilizing civilian and military personnel in national psychological warfare, both at home and in the fields.

Formulation of specific recommendations to SENCC of manpower utilization policies which will obviate or solve these problems, and will ensure that psychological warfare personnel, whether civilian or military, will be assigned to posts solely on the basis of maximum usefulness, irrespective of civilian or military status.

3. Examination of the problems involved in training and indoctrinating field personnel, both civilian and military, for psychological warfare, with recommendations for the organization and functions of a suitable training organization.

a. Communications:

Examination of the technical requirements for rapid and secure communication to the field of psychological warfare directives, and recommendations of organization, staff, machinery, and procedures to meet these requirements.

4. Intelligence:

Recommendations for a psychological warfare intelligence procedure to ensure that intelligence resources at home and in the field are used to make full intelligence ^{rapidly} ~~and~~ available for the purpose of

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
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making sound psychological warfare decisions, and that cleared materials are made available for operational purposes.

a. Domestic Public Opinion:

Examination of the relations between overseas operations and domestic information operations in wartime.

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F. Recommendations for
the creation of a
wartime psychological
warfare organization.

The ad hoc Committee considers that it is premature at this time to attempt to draft in complete detail the blueprint of a wartime psychological warfare organization. If the recommendation of the preceding section is adopted, it would be the function of the new sub-committee to work on this problem at length, and in detail. It is necessary, however, to establish as the basis for the proposed work of the SWNCC sub-committee, the following points:

- a. Any organization for wartime psychological warfare must provide for a directive procedure which will fully reflect the fact that successful psychological warfare must be integrated with political policy and action, military plans and operations, both on the policy and operating levels. It is also necessary to coordinate "white" and "black" propaganda and related operations, together with deception plans and measures. Proper provision must be made for security throughout. The directive procedure must be flexible and rapid enough to provide for central direction and control of a world-wide system of action, which must work on a fast-breaking basis if it is to make full use of its opportunities. Directive procedures should be established to take care of three general situations:
 1. Inclusion of general, long-term psychological warfare

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plans & policies

~~directives~~ with general, long-term military plans, as *over-all plans*
for example, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directives *From the over-all plan frequent directives can*
on OVERLORD. Such Directives can be drafted, con-
be obtained *over-all plans*
sidered, and cleared at a tempo determined by that of
the military planning of which it is a part.

2. Content Directives issued at regular intervals. Such directives specify on a short-term basis the psychological warfare action to be taken during ensuing weeks or months. They can take account of the general developments of military campaigns, of political policies, and of foreseeable important events requiring special handling. They must be capable of drafting and clearances within one or two days to be of maximum effectiveness.
3. Special Guidances. Such special instructions must be provided to capitalize in a controlled and directed, but rapid manner on sudden military or political developments which have not been foreseen either as to scope, effect, or timing. For maximum effect, they should be capable of drafting, clearance, and transmission to the field in a matter of hours.

b. Recommendations:

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1. It is proposed that a "Central Psychological Warfare Committee" be created, as the body which will translate the raw material of long-term national policy into timely psychological warfare directives which take account of the requirements just specified.
3. The ad hoc Committee does not, at this stage, feel it can recommend the specific composition of the proposed Central Committee. However, it considers it essential that the Central Committee's composition and functions should be of a nature to ensure that the national policy will be rapidly translated into long-term and short-term psychological warfare directives.
2. A chart of a proposed organization is attached as a general guide. It is worth stressing that for purposes of maximum coordination and avoidance of confusion, it is important to have only one directive channel to the field, which leads to the theater commander.


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APPENDIX A

POLICY FLOW CHART

WARTIME PSYCHOLOGICAL POLITICAL WARFARE



Appendix B

